THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF EMERGENCY POWERS
In no place does Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution grant the President the power to suspend a Governor, Deputy Governor, or the State House of Assembly. This reality is backed by constitutional jurisprudence and was reaffirmed in Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 265, where the Supreme Court clarified that the Constitution is supreme and that no authority including the President can act outside its provisions.
Yet, this is not the first time that Nigeria has witnessed an outright abuse of emergency powers. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s 2004 suspension of Plateau State’s Governor Joshua Dariye and the House of Assembly remains a painful reminder of how emergency provisions have been misused to subvert democratic structures.
That unconstitutional precedent, which many Nigerians condemned then as executive overreach reminiscent of military juntas, appears to have resurfaced in Rivers State where President Tinubu’s action has eerily followed that same better-forgotten pattern, with the Judiciary left untouched as a token concession to constitutionalism. But can democracy survive when two out of the three arms of government are arbitrarily dissolved? I believe not.
FEDERALISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
Nigeria operates a federal system, meaning that power is distributed between the central and state governments, as explicitly outlined in Sections 4, 5, and 11 of the 1999 Constitution. Under this system, a Governor is not an apron string of or mere extension of the Presidency. He is an independently elected authority answerable to no one but only the people of his state who elected him.
The Constitution does not permit a President to unilaterally whimsically and arbitrarily remove a Governor—not by fiat; not by emergency decree; and certainly not by mere executive pronouncement. The doctrine of separation of powers, a fundamental pillar of democracy, dictates that such removals must be carried out strictly in accordance with constitutional provisions.
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This principle was reinforced in Attorney-General of Ogun State & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (1982) 3 NCLR 583, where the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Government cannot unilaterally impose duties or restrictions on state officials. This means that even if a state of emergency is lawfully declared, the Governor remains in office unless impeached through due process.
The Constitution provides only one legal pathway for the removal of a state Governor, and that is through impeachment, as stipulated in Section 188 of the Constitution. The process is legislative, not executive, requiring a State House of Assembly to initiate and conduct impeachment proceedings as dictated by the Constitution. In any event, the Rivers State House of Assembly (whether rightly or wrongly) had already commenced one against the Governor. Why truncate the constitutional process through an unconstitutional executive fiat? Why? Why?? Why???
THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL CONTROL
Some have sought, in most illogical and unscholarly manner, to justify the President’s emergency intervention in Rivers State under the masquerade and facade of maintaining public safety. They cite the Public Order Act, which grants state Governors powers over public assemblies, meetings, and processions. However, even this statute does not authorize the suspension of an entire government structure.
The irony, of course, is that while Governors are designated as the Chief Security Officers of their states, they lack actual control over security forces. Section 215 of the Constitution subordinates a State Commissioner of Police to the Inspector General of Police and the President, meaning that even if Rivers State were experiencing insecurity, it was ultimately to the same traducing Federal Government it would have turned to.
The absurdity of this power imbalance, even though Rivers State had not gotten there, was noted in Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264, where the Court observed that the Federal Government cannot pass the blame for state security failures to a Governor who lacks the constitutional means to deploy security personnel.
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: A CONSTITUTIONAL FIREWALL?
Even if the National Assembly, sought to legislate on emergency rule, section 11(4) of the 1999 Constitution explicitly prohibits it from removing a Governor or Deputy Governor. This means that not only does the President lack the power, but even the National Assembly itself is equally barred from such unconstitutional act.
Prof. Ben Nwabueze, one of Nigeria’s foremost constitutional scholars, had long warned that allowing a President to wield unchecked emergency powers would erode democracy and lead to an authoritarian system where Governors served as vassals at the pleasure of the President rather than the electorate.
In line with this reasoning, Chief F.R.A. Williams had condemned the Plateau State emergency declaration as “a contradiction of all known principles of true federation operating in a democratic society.” Are we not now witnessing history repeat itself in Rivers State?
THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
One of the most fundamental principles of statutory interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that the explicit mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all others. Sections 4 and 5 of the 1999 Constitution donate specific executive and legislative powers; but nowhere do they mention any inherent powers allowing the President to remove Governors undemocratically.
This principle was applied in Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 187, where the Supreme Court held that powers not expressly granted by the Constitution cannot be assumed. Thus, any claim that the President possesses inherent emergency powers to remove a supposedly erring Governor is legally baseless.The President can not dorn the garb of a Primary School headmaster who has absolute control over and supervises his pupils
HOW A GOVERNOR MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE
If Not the President, then who can remove a Governor under emergency rule? The answer remains the State House of Assembly as the only body constitutionally empowered to initiate impeachment proceedings against an erring Governor.
Under Section 188, impeachment is a rigorous and multi-step process, requiring:
a.. A written notice signed by at least one-third of Assembly members;
- A two-thirds majority vote to proceed further;
- The formation of an investigative panel by the state Chief Judge;
- A full blown hearing granting the Governor a right to defence either by himself or through a counsel of his choice;
- A final two-thirds majority vote for removal after thorough hearing, recommendations, etc.
If a Governor remains in office, it is because the State House of Assembly has not found legal grounds for removal. The President’s personal opinions, political considerations, or security concerns do not change this constitutional scenario.
ANY HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR RIVERS STATE?
The declaration of a state of emergency in Rivers State and the subsequent suspension of Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his Deputy, and the State House of Assembly by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu brings Nigeria into another moment of constitutional crisis and democratic reckoning. While this may appear to be a novel occurrence, history reminds us that this is not the first time a Nigerian President had wielded emergency powers in a manner that undermined the very very essence of democracy.
Emergency rule in Nigeria has precedents, but each instance had always been marred by legal controversy, constitutional breaches and political opportunism. The most striking parallel to Tinubu’s action in Rivers State can be drawn from the 2004 Plateau State emergency declared by former President Olusegun Obasanjo. In that case, Obasanjo had suspended the Governor and the State House of Assembly, replacing them with a Sole Administrator, Major-General Chris Alli (Rtd.). That action was roundly criticized as an overreach of executive power, much like what is unfolding today in Rivers State. I was one of the critics.
However, even further back in Nigeria’s history, the Western Region crisis of 1962 under the First Republic presents another instructive example. Under the 1960 Independence Constitution, the then Governor-General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, acting on the advice of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, had declared a state of emergency in the Western Region due to political turmoil. Balewa had removed the Premier, the Governor, all Ministers, and members of the Regional Assembly, installing Dr. Moses Majekodunmi as Sole Administrator.
The striking difference, however, is that this took place under a Westminster parliamentary system, where Parliament held sovereignty. In contrast, Nigeria’s current presidential system operates under constitutional supremacy, not parliamentary supremacy. The framers of the 1999 Constitution deliberately excluded any provision that would allow such sweeping executive powers, particularly those that could enable a President to remove a sitting Governor or dissolve a State House of Assembly under emergency rule.