INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, July 27, 2025, respected columnist, Simon Kolawole, published an opinion piece in ThisDay titled, “Back to the 1999 Constitution – Again?” In the said piece, Kolawole sought to downplay or outrightly discredit the persistent and growing calls for the restructuring of Nigeria’s constitutional framework. He targeted, in particular, the longstanding position advanced by patriotic intellectuals and elder statesmen under the collective known as The Patriots, portraying them as revisionists of Nigeria’s constitutional history. But Kolawole’s interpretation not only misrepresents the actual arguments being advanced by The Patriots, it also rests on selective history, unverified assumptions, and a concerning disregard for legal scholarship and political truth. He claimed, among other things, that The Patriots had falsely asserted that the 1999 Constitution was authored by the military and that their stance was either uninformed or deliberately misleading. (See Simon Kolawole, “Let’s Tell Ourselves the Truth about the Constitution,” ThisDay, July 28, 2024.)
PURPOSE OF THIS INTERVENTION
This rejoinder seeks to correct these misrepresentations and restate – clearly and accurately-the long-held position of The Patriots on the 1999 Constitution. It will also address broader issues surrounding the unsuitability of Nigeria’s overcentralized federal structure in a pluralistic society, and highlight areas of the Constitution, particularly the Exclusive Legislative List, that require urgent reform if Nigeria is to remain a just, united, and functional federation.
CLARIFYING THE PATRIOTS’ POSITION ON THE 1999 CONSTITUTION
Simon Kolawole alleges that The Patriots have repeatedly claimed that the 1999 Constitution was “written by the military” and that such a claim is false because “it was drafted by a committee of legal experts and approved by the Provisional Ruling Council.” He suggests that this position lacks intellectual rigor and should be dismissed by well-meaning Nigerians.
However, this is a complete mischaracterization of the Patriots’ position. The Patriots have never claimed that soldiers sat down with pens and drafted the Constitution in a vacuum. No. What they have consistently stated is that the 1999 Constitution is a product of military imposition, lacking the democratic legitimacy that should accompany any foundational legal document in a pluralistic society such as Nigeria.
In a public statement by Professor Ben Nwabueze, SAN – renowned constitutional law scholar and founding member (later Chairman) of The Patriots-it was clearly argued that:
“The 1999 Constitution was imposed by a military regime without a referendum, without public debate, and without the participation of the Nigerian people. It cannot therefore be considered a people’s Constitution.”
Similarly, in a 2001 press briefing, Chief FRA Williams, SAN, another founding member and pioneer chairman of The Patriots, described the 1999 Constitution as:
“A document that merely adapted the 1979 Constitution and was handed down to us by a departing military junta.”
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The use of the term “military Constitution” by The Patriots refers therefore not to its literal authorship by soldiers, but to the flawed process of imposition and the absence of participatory legitimacy through a people’s referendum. It is this absence of democratic authorship and validation that underpins The Patriots’ sustained call for a truly autochthonous Constitution-one emerging from the will and deliberation of the Nigerian people.
To suggest otherwise, as Kolawole did, is to either misunderstand the semantics of constitutional discourse or to deliberately distort the message.I prefer to believe that the former is the case. The consequence of such distortion is dangerous: it undermines the gravity and urgency of constitutional reforms by reducing it to a mere semantic disagreement rather than the existential democratic concern that it actually is.
CRITIQUE OF NIGERIA’S OVERCENTRALIZATION
The evolution of Nigeria’s federal structure is marked by a troubling contradiction: although it is constitutionally designated a federation, the actual distribution of power closely resembles that of a unitary state. This paradox can be traced back to the 1966 military coup and the subsequent unification of the country under a single military command structure. The military, inherently centralist in its command hierarchy, dismantled the regional autonomy that had defined Nigeria’s First Republic (1960–1966). (See Olumide Akanbi, “The Evolution of Nigeria’s Federalism and the Military Factor,” Journal of African Federalism, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2018, p. 45.). What some Northern soldiers considered to be the original sin of General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, (the then Head of State who seized power during the chaos and crises that ensued during the 15th January, 1966 military coup),was his promulgation of Decree No. 34 pf 1967 which abrogated the federal stricture in favour of a unitary one.
Before the 1966 military intervention, Nigeria’s federalism allowed each of the three (later four) regions (with the creation of the Midwest Region on 10th August, 1963, from Western Region by popular referendum of the people) to exercise substantial control over local affairs. These regions had their own Constitutions, public services, and developmental priorities. However, from General Yakubu Gowon’s Decree No. 8 of 1967, which effectively abolished regional governments in favor of 12 militarily-administered states, to the eventual promulgation of the 1999 Constitution by General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s regime, Nigeria has grown increasingly centralized. Thus, there has never been any conscious effort by successive governments – colonial, civil or military, since Nigeria’s Lugardian almagamation on January 1, 1914 – to have a buy-in of the people through a referendum. None from the 1922 Clifford Constitution;1946 Richards Constitution; 1951 Macpherson Constitution; 1954 Lyttleton Constitution; 1960 Independent Constitution; 1963 Republican Constitution; 1979 Constitution; 1989 Constitution; and up to the 1999 Constitution.
This over centralization of powers at the centre poses severe governance challenges in a country as ethnically, culturally, religiously and linguistically diverse as Nigeria. With about 374 ethnic groups (Prof Onigu Otite), at least 500 spoken languages and strong regional identities, a one-size-fits-all approach to governance is both ineffective and inflammatory. As Rotimi Suberu notes, “centralized federalism in Nigeria breeds disaffection, weakens accountability, and fuels centrifugal tensions.” (Rotimi Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p. 112.)
For example, the same educational policy enforced in Zamfara State may be culturally, religiously or economically inappropriate in Bayelsa State. Federal government’s directives on land use, resource control or school curriculum rarely accommodates local realities. Similarly, national security priorities are often applied uniformly without sensitivity to regional insecurity dynamics such as the age-long farmer-herder clashes in the Middle Belt, or self-determination agitations in the South East.
Another critical example is the administration of religion. While the federal Constitution of 1999 claims secularism (section 10), certain states enforce Sharia law, while others either remain secular, practise traditional religion, or remain Christian-dominated. Yet, national laws, judicial and other public structures fail to reflect these peculiar realities, often resulting in policy flip-flops and conflict or discrimination claims. This dissonance between forced constitutional uniformity and lived practical plurality experiences is an enduring source of national instability.
Nigeria’s flawed federalism also impedes development. Federating states are heavily dependent on federally-allocated funds (under section 162 of the 1999 Constitution). This disincentivizes local innovation or internally generated revenue (IGR) strategies. Because federal allocation is distributed by formula rather than performance or resource ownership, states have limited autonomy to plan large-scale infrastructure, education, or healthcare interventions independent of Abuja. This also breeds discrimination and resentment. Oil-rich Bayelsa State, for example, shares from the Federation Account less than may non-oil producing communities notwithstanding the attendant oil and gas–related environmental degradation and prevalent poverty.
OVERHAULING THE EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE LIST
The Exclusive Legislative List in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) contains 68 whole items which only the federal government has power to legislate upon. (See Part I, Second Schedule, Constitution of the 1999 Constitution. This list is excessive and counter-productive in a federal system we pretend to operate in our pluralistic society. It takes away vital areas of governance from the reach of states and local governements, despite their proximity to the people. Among the most problematic items are police and security, prisons, railways, mineral resources, electricity generation and transmission, labour and trade unions, education (particularly tertiary), taxation of certain commodities, matrimonial matters, licensing, etc.
This dominant central control over crucial sectors greatly undermines Nigeria’s federal claim and limits each state’s ability to respond to its unique developmental needs.
Take policing, for example. In the United States and India ( both federal democracies with complex diversities), subnational units maintain their own police forces with full jurisdictional authority. Yet in Nigeria, only the federal government is constitutionally empowered to create or control the police force under sections 214 and 215 of the 1999 Constitution. The implication is that state governors, though constitutionally described as “chief security officers” of their states, can not control security within their borders. (See Yusuf Olaolu Ali, SAN, Federalism and the Nigerian Constitution: A Legal Perspective, Spectrum Law Review, 2016, p. 78.)
This unitarinsm has proven disastrous. States facing terrorist insurgency, mass kidnapping and ethnic violence are unable to develop local policing models or equip forces that understand the terrain and speak local languages or respond to such vices as they occur. The result is a reactive and overstretched federal police, further alienating citizens from security providers.
Similarly, prison administration is fully centralized; yet most of the crimes prosecuted in Nigeria occur under state criminal laws, not federal laws. This mismatch causes logistical and financial burdens on the federal system while delaying justice. A state-based correctional system, aligned with state judicial authority, would be more efficient and localized to deal with local offences.
In the education sector, control over accreditation, curriculum and policy located at the federal level stifles local creativity and ignores peculiar local needs. States such as Lagos and Rivers which have made giant strides in digital learning and school reforms are constantly required to comply with federal laws that may not reflect their educational needs, local priorities or resources.
Another major area of great concern is resource control and mining. Under the 1999 Constitution, all mineral resources are owned by the federal government, with states entitled only to derivation funds. This has perpetuated sustained injustice leading to the conflict in the Niger Delta. It has created a retrogressive culture of dependence where resource-rich states remain poor due to limited control over their God-given assets while non-oil producing states live fat on such poor states. An unjust and obnoxious system of sharing the cake without contributing to its baking has thus emerged.
Globally, federations assign such matters to local authorities. In Canada, provinces control natural resources and generate revenue from them. In India, states co-legislate on police, education and public health under a Concurrent List. In the U.S., the Tenth Amendment reserves unenumerated powers to the states. Nigeria’s failure to adopt similar devolution of powers has painfully hindered innovation, democratic accountability and balanced development.
What is therefore needed is a restructuring of the Exclusive Legislative List, pruning it to only essential national matters such as defence, foreign affairs, banking and currency, while moving most socio-economic functions to the Concurrent or Residual Lists. This would not only align with global federalist principles but also reflect Nigeria’s diverse socio-political realities. Only a brand new Constitution emanating from the people’s will after a Constituent Assembly and referendum can bring about such a revolutionary outcome, not piecemeal amendment of the present 1999 Constitution.
ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN CONSTITUTION-MAKING:
THE LEGISLATURE AS ENABLER, NOT ORIGINATOR
It is axiomatic that under constitutional democracy, sovereignty resides in the people. The legislature, while clothed with enormous powers of lawmaking, is not the primary source or originator of the people’s will. Rather, it is a conduit-a servant and enabler-of that will. Nigeria’s National Assembly, as presently constituted, draws its powers from the 1999 Constitution which is itself a product of military fiat, not of popular affirmation of the people. This reality raises a fundamental legal-philosophical contradiction: can a creature of a flawed document presume to re-birth it? Can a child reconfigure its own paternity? The National Assembly, being a product of a schedule attached to Decree No. 24 of 1999, cannot, ab initio, claim any right to author a new grundnorm that overrides its own existential basis. All it can do is to amend, amend and amend the flawed Constitution under section 9 thereof. The reason is that being the tail (representative agent), it cannot wag the dog (the people that own the will).
The National Assembly’s attempts at constitutional amendment-however noble-have therefore largely been elitist and parliamentary, not popular or plebiscitary. Several constitutional alteration bills have been passed (up to 5 already); yet none has bridged the democratic gap of a sovereign national consensus. None has dared to make Chapter 2 justiciable (the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principle of State Policy). They would never! The people thus watch from the sidelines as professional politicians hold sway over what should be their social contract. That is akin to medical doctors prescribing medication to patients they have not examined. The people’s voice is conspicuously absent in the very document that governs their lives. The legislative arm must therefore reposition itself-not as the progenitor of a new Constitution, but as the facilitator of a new constitutional order birthed by the people themselves through a referendum.
[See Mike Ozekhome, “The Illegality and Illegitimacy of the 1999 Constitution,” ThisDay, April 22, 2024].
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM VS. CONSTITUTIONAL REWRITING
There exists a grave conceptual and legal dissonance in conflating constitutional reform with constitutional rewriting. Reform is cosmetic; rewriting is foundational. The former merely plasters the gaping cracks of a collapsing edifice. The latter reconstructs its very foundation. Nigeria’s current approach has been that of tentative and timid reforms. Reforms through amendments involve mere tinkering with clauses, altering sections, inserting or deleting subsections-all within the same defective legal framework. This is akin to merely repainting a termite-ridden house while ignoring the need to first fumigate and wholly rebuild; or merely cutting off the branches of a tree threatening the foundations of a house, rather than uprooting it completely.
Rewriting on the other hand is a revolutionary act-peaceful, yet radical. It is negotiated. It requires a complete break from the past;a tabula rasa; a fresh convening of the people; and a new social contract that reflects the genuine aspirations of today’s Nigerians;not those of 1998 military oligarch. Countries like South Africa, Kenya and some others have walked this noble path through convocation of Constituent Assemblies participation in national referenda. Why not Nigeria?
To continue operating the 1999 Constitution is to perpetuate a fraud-a self-deceit that we live under democracy when in fact we are governed by relics of khaki rule. The National Assembly must embrace its transitional role and work with civil society, the judiciary, the executive and all Nigerian stakeholders to midwife-not manufacture-a new constitutional dawn.
[See Jibrin Ibrahim, “Why Nigeria Needs a New Constitution, Not Another Amendment,” Premium Times, March 4, 2021].
