WHY TINUBU ’S EMERGENCY RULE IN RIVERS STATE IS UNPRECEDENTED
Even within the history of emergency rule declarations, Tinubu’s action in Rivers State is particularly alarming. While previous Presidents who declared emergency rule (Balewa in 1962 and Obasanjo in 2004) did so under questionable legal interpretations, they at least had some statutory backing, however flimsy.
Tinubu, on the other hand, has no legal foundation whatsoever to suspend an elected Governor, Deputy Governor, or the State House of Assembly. There is no enabling law, no precedent under the 1999 Constitution, and no Supreme Court ruling that grants the President such sweeping powers.
The 1999 Constitution, as amended, is as clear as a whistle that section 305 which grants the President powers to declare a state of emergency does not provide for the removal or suspension of an elected Governor.
Section 11(4) explicitly denies even the National Assembly the power to remove a Governor under emergency rule; meaning it certainly cannot authorize the President to do so.
The principle of federalism, which underpins Nigeria’s governance structure, dictates that Governors derive their mandate directly from the people and not from the President.
WHAT COULD HAPPEN IF THIS PRECEDENT IS ALLOWED TO STAND?
One of the most dangerous aspects of President Tinubu’s action is the precedent it sets for the future of democracy in Nigeria. If a President can wake up one morning and, under the guise of an emergency, remove a Governor and dissolve the State Legislature, what prevents the same President or future Presidents from doing the same in other states?
In fact, if the logic of this unconstitutional action is stretched further, it raises an even more disturbing possibility:
What if a President wakes up tomorrow and declares an emergency in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)? The Constitution recognizes the FCT as a state.
[READ ALSO] President Tinubu Cannot Legally Remove an Elected Governor of a State (2)
Could the President then suspend the Senate and the House of Representatives that supervise the FCT and appoint himself as Sole Administrator of the FCT and Federal Republic of Nigeria?
These hypothetical scenarios, once dismissed as absurd, l in my earlier research have now become real threats when constitutional violations are left unchallenged and unchecked.
PRESIDENT TINUBU ’S ATTEMPT TO RELY ON NONEXISTENT EMERGENCY LAWS
To compound the legal crisis, Tinubu’s government seeks to justify its actions by invoking emergency regulations that do not exist in Nigeria’s current legal framework. The 1961 Emergency Powers Act, which was made pursuant to Section 65(1) of the 1960 Constitution, is no longer in force. That law had allowed the Governor-General to make sweeping regulations, including appointing an Administrator, restricting fundamental rights, and even suspending state governments.
However, this law ceased to have effect long ago. When Nigeria transitioned from the Westminster system to the presidential system in 1979, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted any provision that could allow such broad emergency powers.
The Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, provide a clear confirmation: the 1961 Emergency Powers Act is described as “omitted; spent”. This means that it has since been consigned to the vehicle of historical oblivion and cannot be resurrected to justify Tinubu’s current unconstitutional acts.
A CLOSING CAVEAT: THE PERILOUS PRECEDENT OF TINUBU’S EMERGENCY RULE IN RIVERS STATE
Not a few Nigerians have argued quite plausibly, too, that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s recent declaration of emergency rule in Rivers State and the suspension of Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his Deputy, and the State House of Assembly was not purely a matter of law and order, but an act driven by political expediency and personal indignation.
The President finds himself presiding over a nation teetering on the brink economic hardship, rising insecurity, public angst,and deep-seated political fractures. Yet, rather than confront these crises headlong with statesmanship, his administration appears to be flexing emergency powers in a manner that raises more questions than it answers. If Rivers State warranted emergency rule, why then have states like Zamfara and Niger where armed bandits and insurgents have reduced governance to an afterthought not received the same treatment?
Even the most ardent defenders of Tinubu’s emergency Decree ( for a Decree it is in reality) must pause and ask: Is Rivers State the greatest threat to national stability, or is it merely the most convenient political battleground? If emergency rule in Rivers was truly about law and order, why was a hand-picked Administrator imposed while duly elected officials were unceremoniously suspended from office? Is this about democratic governance, or is it about power and control?
If Nigeria remains a constitutional democracy, then the same Constitution must apply to all, irrespective of political affiliation or convenience. If Tinubu’s draconian action in Rivers State is allowed to stand, it sets a dangerous precedent where emergency powers become a tool for political suppression and repression rather than a last resort for genuine intractable crises.
So, the question remains: Is this the Nigeria we want or deserve? Or shall we, in our studied silence, watch democracy dismantled piecemeal with onevemergency declaration at a time? History will surely judge us all.
